NLE 89-31

SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1942

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

April 28, 1953

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA LIAISON

Honorable Robert Cutler
Administrative Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Cutler:

There is enclosed, as of possible interest, one copy of a document entitled, "Soviet Intelligence Travel and Entry Techniques."

This monograph is a review of the techniques, such as cover occupations and falsifications to support them, which have been used by the Soviet Intelligence Services to place their agents in countries outside the Soviet Union.

Copy No. 5 of this document is being made available for your confidential information, and its contents should not be disseminated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

NR 89-31 #3
#10 12/17/90


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SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TRAVEL AND ENTRY TECHNIQUES



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Agency Case EBT
NLE Case 89-314
By LMD NLE Date 12/27/90

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
John Edgar Hoover, Director

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY INFORMATION — CONFIDENTIAL

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TRAVEL AND ENTRY TECHNIQUES

April, 1953

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
John Edgar Hoover, Director

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PREFACE

A key to the detection of Soviet secret intelligence agents in foreign countries is the discovery of the plans for travel and entry that the Soviet Intelligence services have adapted somewhat successfully to their requirements. A knowledge of the modus operandi of Soviet Intelligence agents has proved to be beneficial to the governments harried by Russian interlopers and their followers. Therefore, a study of Soviet travel and entry techniques may provide basis and direction for the opposing operations required of our counterintelligence and internal security forces.


Trained Soviet agents sent out from Moscow to organize an underground apparatus for long-time operation in a foreign country enter, exit and travel about quite freely because they are protected by falsifications and cover occupations which make them appear above the suspicion of the target country's protecting authorities. Ways have also been devised for securing the entrance of an agent on a single mission and of other persons who will be called upon to cooperate at some distant date.

This paper provides a review of the travel and entry techniques that have been used by the Soviet Intelligence services. Awareness of past

successful Soviet techniques may assist in preventing possibilities from becoming eventualities.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Government has taken a number of steps to control the travel and entry of subversive elements. We impose visa restricti on all people from Iron Curtain countries. We have a program for screening at points of entry those foreigners regarding whom we have adverse informatio We have curtailed the travel privileges of Russia's official representatives -- excepting Soviet nationals with the United Nations or other international organizations -- preventing secret trips in and out, and about the country. We deny passports for extended stay abroad to admitted Communists and to anyone who is found to have given consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line. But the Soviets, in their planning, anticipated rebuffs and set up measures for facilitating clandestine travel and entrance to foreign countries where they wish to collect military, economic or political information.



The direct attention that the Soviet Intelligence headquarters devotes to travel and entry techniques is illustrated by "Task No. 3 of 1.8.45 "* assigned to Sam Carr, a member of a Soviet Military Intelligence network operating in Canada. Among the nine items to be reviewed and reported to the "Director" in Moscow are:

* 1.8.45 is August 1, 1945, not January 8, 1945.

"4. More expedient methods to slip into the country.

"5. Conditions of entry into the country and of moving about in the country." *

[redacted]


* The Report of the Royal Commission, June 27, 1946, p. 553.

** [redacted]

[redacted]

An agent who was active during the 1930's said that for the protection of cover stories there was, in the OGPU offices in Moscow during his time, a passport department for the preparation of any necessary documents. He stated that he gathered this from conversations as well as from his original dealings with George Miller, a photographer employed in the passport office.

[redacted]




I. COVER UTILIZED BY SOVIET INTELLIGENCE FOR TRAVEL AND ENTRY

[redacted]

Aware that its legal residents in a foreign country are under suspicion, Soviet Russia, therefore, has provided for its secret agents to travel to and enter a country by illegal means, attempting to cover

[redacted]

all technical illegalities of identification, transportation and occupation by falsifications that appear to be legitimate explanations. An agent may enter the country intending to carry out his assigned covert duties independent of official cover, but under private cover -- outwardly engaged in some innocent, legitimate and perhaps worth-while employment. In this connection, experience has taught our security agencies to suspect all Soviets who enter our country. Although there are thousands of anti-Soviet Russians in the United States, some of our espionage cases prove that the Russian Intelligence Service urges former Russians to cooperate. A Soviet defector who traveled back and forth from Russia to the United States between 1936 and 1940 has warned us regarding his countrymen.



A. Official

Since, as was observed above, legal entrance of Soviet Intelligence agents under official cover is the least complicated scheme, these favored official covers, operated exhaustively by the Russians, should be examined for their past success.

1. The United Nations

Russian membership in the United Nations organization offers one official gateway for the Russians to enter the Western Hemisphere.

Moreover, employees of and delegates to the United Nations are entitled to certain privileges, exemptions and immunities accorded to international organizations in the United States. The United Nations organization, having the USSR as a member nation, offers a legal opportunity for the Soviets to introduce their agents into the United States, unhampered by restrictions limiting the area of their travels. The activity of Valentin Gubitchev showed that he had been placed in the United Nations for the purpose of contacting and receiving information from one or more informants like Judith Coplon.

[redacted]

2. Diplomatic and Consular Services

[redacted]

[redacted]

Between January, 1942, and August, 1944, Vassili M. Zubilin served in the United States as Third Secretary, then as Second Secretary, of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C.; but it is alleged that he actually at the same time engaged in intelligence operations in the United States and Mexico. Meantime, his wife allegedly operated a network of agents in the United States Government agencies. Anatoli B. Gromov, exposed by Elizabeth Bentley, was First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., prior to his departure for Russia in 1945. On January 15, 1953, Yuri Novikov, a Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., was declared persona non grata by the United States Department of State after a Washington grand jury indictment named him coconspirator in espionage against the United States. [redacted]

Besides the Secretaries of the Soviet Embassy in Canada, the report of the Royal Commission regarding ~~Soviet Intelligence operations~~ in Canada lists fifteen other Soviet Embassy staff members who gave themselves

over to espionage operations sometime or another after the embassy was established in 1942.

Teachers at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages have been said to speak openly of attaches as "legalized spies."

Besides embassies, the Soviets also utilize consulates in foreign countries as bases for espionage operations. Pavel Klarin, Soviet Vice Consul in New York City in 1943 and 1944, was, according to the statements of his contacts, engaged in the operation to release Frank Jacson, Leon Trotsky's murderer. Pavel Mikhailov, as acting Soviet Consul General at the New York Consulate, was the official Soviet contact of several persons identified or strongly suspected as espionage agents and, according to Igor Gouzenko's testimony, assisted in setting up the Soviet Military Intelligence organization in Canada in 1942 and 1943. Anatoli A. Yakovlev entered the United States on February 8, 1941, as a clerk at the Soviet Consulate in New York City. He operated Harry Gold who obtained data from Klaus Fuchs. The Soviet consulates in San Francisco and Los Angeles have also in the past proved to be staffed with employees active in espionage tasks and also in operating Soviet agents within governmental agencies.

Igor Gouzenko, whose defection to Canadian authorities resulted in exposing much of the workings of the Soviet Intelligence organizations, stated among other things, that the Soviet Consul at Halifax had been employed by the Soviet Military Intelligence Office.

[redacted]

3. Diplomatic Courier Service

[redacted]

4. Trade Delegations and Purchasing Commissions

A legal opportunity for travel and entrance to a foreign country is open also to Soviet Government Purchasing Commissions and to trade organizations such as Amtorg. But the privilege of operating such organizations has been abused by the Soviets. Amtorg has been a cover for Soviet Intelligence ever since its founding in 1924, as was Arcos in England.

The Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, although originally set up in the United States to handle lend-lease shipments, was simultaneously and subsequently used as a cover for bringing espionage agents into the country.

Victor Kravchenko, formerly an inspector for the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, cited the case of Semen Vassilenko, an employee of the Commission, who flew from Washington to Moscow in February, 1944, with six pouches of material dealing with new and extremely secret developments in war industry in the United States.

Gaik Ovakimian, once a leading Soviet agent in the United States, entered this country on August 15, 1933, on passage paid by the Russian Government. He was en route to Amtorg. In 1936, he traveled to Russia, returning on a temporary visitor's visa the same year. Subsequently, he obtained thirteen extensions of permits to stay in the United States, all of them requested by Amtorg. The last such extension, which expired June 1, 1941, was requested in November, 1940, and indicated that Ovakimian was still conducting research in United States chemicals production for the Soviet Government.


Major Sokolov came to Canada in 1942 ostensibly as a Soviet inspector of work in Canadian factories in connection with the Canadian Mutual Aid Program to the USSR. Meantime, he was a member of an espionage network controlled by key agents in the United States.

After the opening of diplomatic offices in Canada, Sokolov was turned over to Zabotin's network. Confusing to the Canadian authorities was the fact that Sokolov wore a uniform although not officially on the staff of the Military Attache of the Soviet Embassy, but on that of the Commercial Counsellor.

5. News-gathering Agencies

Another legal passageway to a foreign country is as a representative for a news-gathering agency such as Tass, which Richard Sorge pointed out as a cover for collecting information. Such representatives also have legitimate cover for asking detailed questions and for roving about from place to place.

Richard Sorge, who headed the Shanghai conspiracy, was correspondent for German newspapers -- the Frankfurter Zeitung, and the Amsterdam Handelsblatt. The vast amount of travel and research he engaged in for the success of the papers and magazines he represented was, he insisted, the key to his successful Soviet espionage activity in the Far East. Sorge said he covered all his spy activity by his correspondent duties.



6. Red Cross

Alexander Foote, a British soldier with the International Brigade in Spain, said that for some reason the Party decided he was a suitable person to run a Red Cross truck which was to go to Spain from England at regular intervals, carrying medical supplies, etc. However, his real job was to be a courier between King Street (headquarters of the

British Communist Party) and the Communist command of the British Battalion of the brigade. He was also to act as passeur for unauthorized persons who wished to enter Spain. *

G. Bessedovsky, the former Charge d' Affaires and First Counsellor of the USSR in Paris, following his break with the USSR in 1929, made the statement that consideration was being given to sending to the United States an official of the OGPU, Dr. Scheftel, who would be presented as a representative of the Soviet Red Cross.

Louis Budenz, in a notarized affidavit dated November 11, 1950, and submitted to the House Committee on Un-American Activities, wrote:

> "...I now know that this man Roberts was in reality Dr. Gregory Rabinowitz, or Rabinowitch, head of the Russian Red Cross in the United States....
>
> "It is significant that the Soviet dictatorship has been so unscrupulous in its dealings with the American nation that it would use the International Red Cross (with which the Russian Red Cross was then connected) to advance espionage activities of various sorts in the United States. It is ironical that the Kremlin would use, or misuse, an organization devoted to the saving of lives for the purpose of destroying the lives of its enemies by assassination."

* Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1949), p. 15.

7. Commercial Coverage

[redacted]

a. Individual Character

[redacted]

Moische Stern who conducted extensive Soviet Intelligence operations in the United States during the 1930's tells how he obtained a contract in this country as European representative to sell infrared ray equipment on a commission basis. This connection gave him an entree to European industrialists, military engineers, etc. The equipment was manufactured at Delft, Holland.

Several illegal resident agents have operated in England as American businessmen. One experienced agent came to the United States as an English businessman but when in London posed as an American businessman.

Whittaker Chambers, confessed courier for a Soviet Military Intelligence apparatus in the United States, has told of his preparations to head a London branch of Maxim Lieber's New York publishing business. Lieber had been desiring this branch office. Now the Soviet apparatus would finance one for him. Chambers would do a regular job of seeing authors and preparing manuscripts received from the British, among whom Lieber already had some contacts. At the same time, Chambers would assist "Bill," his Soviet Intelligence superior, in setting up an apparatus in England. To use the United States as a base for establishing Soviet apparatuses in other countries was then a common practice.

Whittaker Chambers tells of another instance when the Soviets used a similar device. John Sherman, one of Chambers' superiors, had been ordered to go to Tokyo, Japan, and there set up a Soviet espionage apparatus. For this purpose he said that he needed a cover as a representative of a legitimate American business. He said that he also needed an assistant

and the latter would have to be an American-born Japanese with connections in high Japanese circles. It was Sherman's idea that they should set up an organization to be known as the American Feature Writers Syndicate. The purpose of the organization would be to place correspondents around the world. Plans were accordingly put under way.

William Hoffman (Willie Brandes), known for his military espionage activity in the British Wollwich Arsenal Case, posed as a commercial representative for the Phantom Red Cosmetic Company and for the Charak Furniture Company--both of New York City.


By contract dated March 21, 1941, the United States Service and Shipping Corporation in New York was designated as exclusive agent and representative in the United States, Canada and Mexico for Intourist, the official Russian travel agency. Elizabeth Bentley declared it was set up with Communist Party, USA, money or Soviet funds and was a cover firm for Soviet espionage in the same category with World Tourists, Incorporated. Regarding World Tourists, Louis Budenz stated before a United

States Congressional subcommittee that Jacob Golos, while head of the Control Commission of the Communist Party (time not stated), was directing espionage through that organization.

[redacted]

b. Collective Character

[redacted]




[redacted]

According to a former Soviet Government representative, so-called closed organizations were set up in foreign countries several years ago by Soviet Intelligence. These organizations, he said, are headed by an experienced agent who handles important espionage work and in the meantime has no contact whatsoever with any official Soviet Government representative. The agent who is the head of a closed organization is, the informant said, ordinarily not a Soviet citizen, but has assumed another identity based upon a false foreign passport.

8. Study Groups

[redacted]



B. Private (Nonofficial)

1. Specialists

Among specialists admitted abroad as legitimate worthy visitors are such as Dr. Alan Nunn May, the British nuclear physicist sent to Canada and the United States with a group of physicists. Soviet Military Intelligence urged him to undertake espionage in connection with his scientific studies.

A former Soviet Intelligence agent in the United States said that a Russian specialist would be sent out of the country on a special mission, but before he departed or after he arrived at his destination that specialist

would be asked to perform a special task for Russian Intelligence. The specialist, he said, would be "hounded" until he completed the job.

[redacted]

2. Students Sent Abroad


A former Soviet agent, whose name cannot be mentioned for security reasons, speaking about USSR students who are sent abroad for higher education, stated that all individuals who are allowed to leave the USSR must have a specific reason such as industrial espionage or preparation for future assignments either in the country to which they are sent or to some other country at a later period. He advised that students come within this category.

[redacted]

3. Foreign Nationals Trained and Returned to Operate in Their Native Land

One of Elizabeth Bentley's supervisors, Anatoli B. Gromov, who had formerly served as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., once became concerned about her activity being

discovered, he told her it might be well for her to go to Moscow and receive special training. Thereafter, he said, she might be sent to Latin America, Canada, or she might be returned to the United States under another name.



4. Naturalized Citizens

An example of another type of legal entrance of an individual espionage agent is that of Simon A. Rosenberg. He was born in Poland but naturalized in the United States and employed by the Amtorg Trading Corporation. In 1931 he went to the Soviet Union as an engineer and was, he said, compelled to work for the OGPU, or his sister in Kiev would be killed. He signed a pledge and returned to the United States in 1932 where he contacted numerous Soviet agents and fulfilled assignments.


5. Foreign-born Spouses

Hede Massing was born in Austria. It was her marriage to Julian Gumperz, an American, that was influential in securing for her an American passport which in turn made her a valuable courier for Soviet Intelligence. Her next step was to become a naturalized citizen of the United States. As a consequence, she retained her citizenship and passport privileges although her next husband was a foreigner.

6. Refugees

Victor Kravchenko testified before a United States Congressional committee that in the early war years there was a great mass of refugees

who entered countries of the Western Hemisphere and that among these refugees were numerous agents of the NKVD.



7. Growing Up Agents from the Inside

The plan which Krivitsky referred to as "growing up agents from the inside" should be mentioned here. It is not a scheme to facilitate travel and entry, but rather a technique to avoid the problem of travel and entry. This method has the disadvantage of delayed maturity, but Krivitsky said it had been regularly used by the Soviets. It is understood that Soviet Military Intelligence using this plan is prepared in some instances to wait for ten or fifteen years for results, and in some cases has paid the expenses of a university education for promising young men in the hope that they might eventually obtain diplomatic posts or other key positions in the service of the country in which they are nationals.

Similarly, to circumvent the American passport problem, Paul Crouch, an acknowledged former Communist, testified that Russian secret police in 1928 worked on a plan to have members of the Young Communist League employed with the State Department. Through them,

the Soviet Government would then supposedly have access to blank American passports.*


The patience required in Soviet espionage activity is illustrated in an instance referred to by Julius Rosenberg, according to an informant. Rosenberg is reported to have said he advanced money to a young couple to open a business in the West. For years, according to the report, this couple operated a business to build up a front. During difficult times, Rosenberg supplied money to keep the business going. But during Rosenberg's later operations this man acted as a go-between, "for example, for men who had microfilm to send to me for further conveyance." This man in the western city served as a secret drop for the East-to-West connections.

Closely allied to this technique is an instance referred to during an interview with a former Soviet agent. Mention was made of a Russian couple who came to the United States September 11, 1936, and left April 28, 1937. The agent said the indication was that the couple had probably been sent to this country for one special assignment or else "to establish" themselves or obtain a background so that they could be used in other countries.

*"Government's Proposed Findings of Fact submitted to the Subversive Activities Control Board," July 28, 1952.

C. Summary

II. FALSE IDENTITY TO AID TRAVEL AND ENTRY OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE



Leon Helfand, a former Russian ambassador to Rome, stated that important espionage work is handled by experienced agents who enter the country illegally disclaiming Soviet citizenship and remaining under an assumed identity based upon a false passport.

Some of these illegal schemes for travel and entry are illustrated by instances which follow. Variations to correspond with the time and the country to be entered have been noted, but for the most part illegal travel follows a pattern. Viewing the pattern and noting instances of application might assist an investigator in his problems of trying to figure out what activity may have preceded a step he discovers, and what further steps the foreign agent might undertake unless prevented.

A. De-Russianizing

Concerning the selection of personnel to be utilized by the Russians in their intelligence work abroad, Elizabeth Bentley recalled that her superior had emphasized the need for "de-Russianizing" their agents as much as possible. This de-Russianizing used to be a study of the Foreign Department in Moscow from which agents are dispatched. Furthermore, the process may be continued under the tutelage of a native Communist assigned to aid the newly arrived agent in managing dress, language, and customs, so he can move about unnoticed.

Language is one of the high hurdles for illegal Soviet agents. It is not unusual for a foreign agent to prepare himself with several languages. Elizabeth Bentley said that her superior, whom she called "Jack," was studying Spanish and familiarizing himself with Latin American affairs in general. He never indicated to her, though, whether the Russians were going to send him to Latin America or whether he himself intended to go.

Hede Massing believed that she was invited to participate in espionage because of her "ability to get along with people and to move in varied circles without difficulty." Then too, she explained, she had married an American citizen and accordingly possessed a legitimate American passport -- the best protection for any European traveler at that time.

B. False Legends

For the sake of assuming a safe identification, an illegal resident agent needs a completely new legend to cover his life from birth to the present. Supplying the basis for these legends by securing legally registered birth certificates became a valued source of income for Communists in Canada and the United States in the 1930's and 1940's.

To smooth entry into Panama from the United States for the purpose of developing an intelligence contact, a Soviet agent sailed from New York with letters of introduction to various clubs in Panama signed by one Levy, who had been in Panama before. As a pretext for going to Panama, the agent was prepared to say that from his friend, Malcolm Whitaker, he had received a letter of recommendation to Major General Preston Brown, the Military Governor of the Canal Zone. This letter stated that the agent was on a pleasure trip and was going to visit the Browns.

C. False Documents

1. Birth Certificates

Originally, the principal requirement for obtaining a birth certificate was a witness to certify the identity of the applicant at a local office for vital statistics. Consequently, the Soviets had not been reduced to moving their secret agents as false hockey players or under any other disguises. They simply entered Canada or the United States illegally and within a short time received citizenship and passport papers -- both false.

One informant has stated that outside of Russia in the actual operation of the intelligence unit there is always one person who handles documents and obtains related information. According to his standing,

that person has the title of Inspector and is usually an assistant to the agent in charge of the intelligence operations in that country. According to the anonymous letter mailed to the FBI on August 7, 1943, Vassili Zubilin, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., was revealed to be personally engaged in the illegal moving of agents into and out of the United States and in preparing counterfeit documents.

When Hede Massing was working for the Russians in 1935, she said she was told to get hold of some birth certificates. The only way she was able to comply was to contact an important official of the Communist Party, USA, a tactic which her Soviet superior considered a regrettable necessity. She met him six or eight times in two or three months and eventually received the birth certificates in a sealed envelope, for which she paid him cash.

A Hungarian Communist, Alexander Goldberger, who was known to his espionage contacts in the United States as J. Peters and as Stevens, had developed a system for trafficking in essential birth certificates, naturalization papers and other identifying documents for his contacts. One of them -- Whittaker Chambers -- told about Peters having several young Communists working in the Genealogical Division of the New York Public

Library. Some of these individuals would look up births of children who were born in the early part of the century; others would search for deaths which occurred during the same period. The lists of births and deaths were then compared. For example, Chambers said, a John Smith was found to have been born in 1900 and died several years later. An application then would be made for a copy of the birth certificate of John Smith. Communist Party members, using the names of parents listed on either the birth or death certificates, would write for photostat copies of these birth certificates to be mailed to a cover address from which they were turned over to Peters. It was Chambers' impression that Peters received hundreds of these birth certificates which were used as the basis for securing legal passports, not all of which were to be used by espionage workers but some for Communist Party underground activity.

John Loomis Sherman, Whittaker Chambers' superior in a United States espionage apparatus, was designated to go to Tokyo, Japan, to set up an apparatus. He ordered Chambers to get him the needed papers. Peters obliged Chambers by securing a birth certificate in the name of Charles Chase on which Sherman procured a passport enabling him to travel to Japan and back to the United States. For a subsequent journey

Sherman did not make use of the same birth certificate but required Chambers through Peters to procure another. The one provided on this occasion was in an Irish name. It is to be noted that, although Sherman was American born, he falsified his identity.

Between late 1935 and early 1937, Mr. and Mrs. Edward Joseph Herbert rented a furnished New York apartment from which they made three trips to Europe. The front sheet of the passport application of Mrs. Herbert contains a handwritten notation that a photostatic copy of the birth certificate of Sarah Graff was presented at the passport office. Mrs. Herbert directed that the passport be mailed to her New York address. Subsequent investigation disclosed that the real Edward Joseph Herbert and the real Sarah Graff had died as infants during the first year of their lives and that the couple traveling as Mr. and Mrs. Herbert were actually Mr. and Mrs. Vassili Zubilin, both Soviet Intelligence personnel.

Zubilin later, in 1942, became a member of the Russian Embassy staff in Washington, D. C.

Alfred Tilton directed Soviet Military Intelligence in the United States (1927-1930) from New York City under the name of Joseph Paquett. He supported this false identity with fraudulent Canadian papers obtained

with the assistance of Tim Buck, Secretary of the Canadian Communist Party. Later, by means of more fraudulent documents, Tilton became "Alfred Martin."

Communists placed in offices that could assist Soviet operations were an important part of the scheme for securing identification papers. When Whittaker Chambers was scheduled to go to England to help his superior, "Bill," set up a Soviet apparatus, Chambers' family, consisting of wife and daughter, were to accompany him. Not only must he have papers for himself and his wife, but also for his infant daughter. J. Peters again obliged, securing birth certificates for Chambers and his wife in the name of David Breen. Then to perform the rest of his duty, Peters visited the City Hall at Atlantic City where he contacted the "right" individual (Chambers presumed he was a Communist), and for a fee, had the name of Ursula Breen written into the birth records and a regular birth certificate issued in that name.

Peters was assisted also in getting hold of petitions of persons seeking naturalization, who included on their petition the names of minor children. He used these petitions to secure passports in the names of the children listed thereon.

A former Comintern agent who operated periodically in the United States explained that birth certificates of dead Party members or other people who were considered "safe" were sent to the National Office from the district organizers of the Party.

2. Affidavits of Faked Relatives

This spurious method of getting into and out of a country by using "safe" birth certificates was only one of several illegal methods used by the Soviet Intelligence services. Another method was to claim relationship with someone who could assist in gaining the required foundations for openly acquiring the needed legal papers.

To assist him in his problems of "explaining" his way around, a Soviet operator leaving Moscow was frequently given the status of a "phone relative of a citizen he would contact abroad and from whom he had been separated a number of years. Here again a legend would be required: the agent would be given a complete background which he would be requested to memorize prior to making any contact in the country he would enter.

When "Mark Jonas," Soviet agent destined to operate in Poland, entered the United States to organize his group, he was sponsored by a Benjamin Taishoff. When interviewed, Taishoff denied any wrongdoing,

stating that he had received a letter from the man using the name "Haas." Appropriately recalling that they were cousins, "Haas" asked Taishoff to furnish him an affidavit. Taishoff complied.

3. Naturalization Certificates

Sources have made it clear that Russia told its agents to be on the lookout for naturalization certificates. One agent said he contacted an undertaker in Chicago to obtain naturalization certificates from unclaimed bodies. These certificates he said were subsequently utilized for illegal Soviet activities.

Alfred Tilton, who once directed Soviet Military Intelligence in the United States, arranged with an undertaker in Brooklyn to purchase the naturalization papers of a deceased American soldier, Frank Kleges. Afterward, a Soviet agent assumed that identity, set about acquiring an American background and then went to Paris on a fraudulent American passport.

Aaron Marcovitch and Adolph Stark, also of Montreal, were apparently instrumental in procuring false Canadian papers for various Russian agents who desired to establish Canadian identities in order to facilitate their going to European countries to engage in espionage. Investigation proved that an illegal passport bureau was maintained at Montreal, Quebec, for the purpose of fabricating information upon which Canadian naturalization papers and passports were obtained for persons obviously connected with Russian OGPU activities. For an agent to go to Montreal "to change his feathers" (meaning to obtain the basis for new identity) was not unusual.

When arrested by Canadian authorities for internment, Stark and Marcovitch had between 150 and 200 applications for Canadian citizenship and other documents in their possession. These two men had been directed, at least to some extent, by a Mr. Stern of the United States who engineered such fraudulent activities in both Canada and the United States and who appeared to be an OGPU official.

Aaron Marcovitch had even approached the Canadian Postmaste General Ernest Bertrand to get him to sign a letter recommending for citizenship one Willie Brandes who later proved to be a Russian espionage agent. Mr. Bertrand fully trusted Marcovitch, who "worked in my committee all through the elections under the supervision of my campaign manager." Nevertheless, the deception worked out by Marcovitch went so far as to include a false father for Brandes and also a false marriage which the rabbi, listed as officiating, denied performing.

4. Passports

[redacted]

One of Ovakimian's agents stated that some passports were obtained on the basis of naturalization papers which had been either legally or illegally obtained and some were obtained on various birth certificates,


since, during the period of his operations, no independent investigation was made of the applicant for the passport.

Jacob Golos, president of World Tourists Incorporated and Elizabeth Bentley's superior, was instrumental in finding "safe" people who would go to the Federal Agencies with the pictures of those to whom passports were to be issued in order to fill out the questionnaires and swear to the correctness of all answers given. The same people received the passports when they were delivered and handed them over to Golos.

[redacted]

The Robinson-Rubens passport fraud case makes clear that during the 1930's illegally obtained passports were procured through the New York County Clerk's Office. Falsified applications were passed to the County Clerk through a chain of Government employees, making final certification a favor for a friend. In other instances $500 or $1,000 was paid per passport.

[redacted]



At the end of a tour of duty, agents are sometimes summoned back to Moscow either for discussions or to take a course in some specialized subject. In such cases, the individual travels to some other country -- usually one with a common frontier with the USSR -- and there at a prearranged rendezvous, he meets an agent from the Center* who hands him a new passport, sometimes a Russian one, containing the necessary visas, of course, bearing a false name. In return, the recalled agent hands over to the Center's agent a sealed envelope containing his original passport and necessary documentation which he receives back on his return from Russia.

Following an espionage mission Nicholas Dozenberg returned from China to Moscow in 1937. He stopped en route at the Soviet Consulate in Paris for a Soviet visa. Within three days, the visa was issued on a separate slip. Dozenberg stated that visas of this nature were commonly used and surrendered at the Soviet border in order that one's passport would not disclose that particular trip into the USSR.

* Intelligence headquarters in Moscow.

Walter Krivitsky said it was not unusual for the Comintern representative or the OGPU agents in America to send American passports to Moscow where a staff was employed in "fixing" such documents accordin to the needs. Hede Massing referred to the "cobbling" of "captive" passports.

In 1924, the Berlin police raided Comintern headquarters and seized a number of German passports, together with files listing the names of their original owners, the true names of the agents to whom they were issued and the false names under which the agents were traveling.

Russians have had much experience in forging documents. Pre-Revolution conditions in Czarist Russia gave them exceptional training in the art. The elaborate passport regulations which became prevalent in most European countries after 1918 found the Bolsheviks well prepared. Experts in the offices of Soviet Intelligence forge consular signatures and government seals wholly indistinguishable from the genuine articles, according to Krivitsky.

Krivitsky stated further that the O. M. S. (International Liaison Section of the Comintern), unlike the OGPU and Military Intelligence, did not actually manufacture passports. Instead they procured genuine passports and "doctored" them according to requirements. To obtain genuine passports, the OM S. drew up the fanatical zeal of Communist members and sympathizers. For example, if the OM. S. representative in the


United States required two American passports for agents in China, he communicated with his contact in the American Communist Party, who in turn obtained the passports from Party members or sympathizers. When the O. M. S. staff of approximately ten members received the passports, it removed the photographs, substituted others and made other necessary changes. Benjamin Gitlow stated that two passport factories operated for the Comintern and OGPU, one in Berlin, Germany, and one in Moscow.

Blunders in all this falsifying are bound to occur. Following are a few that have been noted:

1. An old date passport that appears to be new.
2. Entries made with the same ink and the same handwriting although they have reference to different places of issue or places of entry.
3. An exchanged photograph on the passport instead of bearing a genuine stamped impression carries a copy in indelible pencil.
4. A subsequent entry of alleged residence in a different type of writing.
5. Pages replaced by other pages recently inserted.
6. Particular figures on the upper edges of passport pages cut off to conceal certain data.

Klausen, upon leaving Moscow for Tokyo, was furnished three passports -- Canadian, Russian, German -- each made up under a different name. Swiss police unearthed the information that during a period of two years, Ignatz Reiss, who operated Hede Massing's early activity in Soviet Service, used seven or eight different names and traveled on forged passports furnished by Soviet officials in the different European countries.

A Soviet defector describes his own experiences as follows: After it was decided that he would be sent to the United States, he had to see a person in "a little office in a building on Lubianka Square." The person in charge he found had already been notified and greeted him with: "I'll give you an American passport. Do you want to be an American citizen?" This person then referred him to a laboratory technician who asked him if he should like to be a Dane. The technician then brought in an old Danish telephone book and out of the classified section entitled "Pharmacists" selected a name in which the fraudulent passport was to be made up. But when actually made up, the passport described a merchant. For the American passport the name of a naturalized American doctor of Yugoslav origin was used. The agent was instructed to travel via Vienna on the American passport where he should meet a contact and exchange it for the Danish passport which was to be sent to Vienna by diplomatic pouch.



A notable opportunity for procuring coveted Canadian and United States passports came during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). According to Walter Krivitsky, all volunteers' passports were taken up when they arrived in Spain, and very rarely was a passport returned.

Even when a man was discharged he was told that his passport had been lost. From the United States alone hundreds of volunteers went over. Krivitsky further reported that nearly every diplomatic pouch from Spain arriving at the Lubianka* contained a batch of passports from members of the International Brigade. He said that one day in the spring of 1937, a batch of about a hundred passports arrived; half of them were American. They had belonged to dead soldiers and after some weeks of inquiry into family histories of their original owners could easily be adapted to a Soviet espionage agent.

Sometime around December, 1940, according to Elizabeth Bentley's statement, her superior, Jacob Golos, under investigation by the Dies Committee, ** opened a package and started to burn the contents, among which she specifically recalled were approximately thirty or forty American passports. Golos explained that these passports were left with him by people who had gone to fight in Spain.

Fraudulent passport techniques of the Soviet Intelligence services are demonstrated by the Witczak case. Message #11436 dated August 14, 1945, from Moscow to "Grant" (code name for Colonel Nikolai Zabotin, Canadian Military Attache) was among the Russian documents Igor Gouzenko placed before the Royal Commission after he decided to break away from the Soviet Union. The message contains instructions regarding the obtaining of a new fraudulent Canadian passport for Witczak, whom Gouzenko identified

* A prison in Moscow.

** A special committee of the United States House of Representatives under the chairmanship of Representative Martin Dies of Texas set up in 1938 for investigation of un-American activities. Dies retired from the House in 1944, but the committee was put on a permanent basis and called the Committee on Un-American Activities in January, 1945.

as a person assigned by the Soviet Union to the United States to build up an independent espionage network to be used in event diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are broken off.

Zabotin, working through Sam Carr, Organizing Secretary of the Communist Party for all of Canada, had been endeavoring for approximately a half year to date of the telegram to secure a passport for Witczak biding his time as a student at a Los Angeles, California, university and engaging in some obvious recruiting for espionage.

Back in 1930, a bachelor, Ignacy Witczak, journeyed from Kurowo, Poland, to the Ontario district of Canada where he became a farm laborer and received naturalization papers in 1935. In 1937, he secured a passport and went to Spain with the MacKenzie-Papineau Battalion of the International Brigade. At the military base of Abacete he and some others were relieved of their passports by an officer who stated that such documents should not be taken into the front line as they might be destroyed. When Witczak applied for his passport at the end of his term of service, he was told at brigade headquarters that the trucks which had carried the passports had been bombed, "probably" destroying the passports. Upon his return to Canada he did not apply for a new passport but did receive new naturalization papers, the original ones, he said, he lost while swimming a river in Spain. In 1945, Moscow assured Sam Carr that the real Witczak had died in the Spanish Civil War.

United States immigration records show that "Ignacy and Bunia Witczak," Canadians, landed in New York from Boulogne September 13, 1938. In 1940, one Ignacy Samuel Witczak registered in Los Angeles as an alien "merchant," "last arrived in the United States at Detroit, Michigan, on September 25, 1938. I came in by railroad unknown." He stated he was born at Kurowo, Poland. Such was the legend of the California Witczak, the fictitious Witczak.

According to the files of notes Gouzenko displayed to the Royal Commission, Sam Carr had been instructed to obtain a new passport as well as a new identity for the Soviet Witczak but was having trouble arranging the transfer of identification from the real Witczak to the spurious one. Problems of naturalization and marriage were uppermost. It developed that the original Witczak's passport dated March 12, 1937, was used by Sam Carr and his aides to secure a renewal for the California Witczak. Questionnaires were provided, signatures forged, photographs supplied, and an office employee bribed to substitute a manufactured 1937 application form in the files for the original 1937 application, in order to furnish the basis for the issue of a new 1945 passport to the spurious Witczak.

Anticipating that it might be necessary to surrender the old passport or, at least, to produce it for inspection at the Passport Office, Sam Carr suggested that burning it and leaving nothing except the number with which to compare the 1937 application would appear authentic. Carr's fee

for the whole transaction was set first at $5,000, but Moscow termed it "fantastic," so he reduced it to $3,000.


The passport was secured, but investigators have since brought to light the stealthy maneuvering that now plainly reveals the forgery. Shortly after Gouzenko defected, the fictitious Witczak mysteriously disappeared.

The case of Arthur Adams is a record of a number of journeys between the United States and Russia. On December 8, 1937, Samuel Novick, treasurer of the Wholesale Radio Service Company, Inc., New York City, wrote to the United States Consul at Toronto, Canada, asking permission to import his Canadian representative, Arthur Adams, as a skilled laborer. However, Adams was denied admission as there was no shortage in the labor field for which he was to be imported. Therefore, on March 31, 1938, Adams himself wrote the Immigration and Naturalization Service, advising that he did not desire to enter the United States as a skilled contract laborer as he was now an independent specialist, and that besides doing work for Wholesale Radio he planned to perfect a cream-whipping machine. He further explained that he planned to establish a laboratory of his own under the name of Technological Laboratories, Inc.

On May 16, 1938, Adams again executed a "Preliminary Questionnaire for Immigration Visa," stating, "I am in business for myself." Under that section devoted to showing his purpose in coming to the United States, he stated: "I have organized in New York a Technological

Laboratory for the development of mechanical and electrical devices. The business is incorporated in the State of New York...I am the President..."

On the basis of the above cover, a fraudulent Canadian birth certificate and statements made by friends, Adams entered the United States on May 17, 1938, with permission to stay four months. Ignoring the four-months limitation, he took up residence in the United States.



Prior to 1938, Adams had entered the United States. On two of these occasions -- November 1, 1928, and again on December 5, 1932 -- he came in as a Soviet Government representative making inquiry concerning plans and equipment for factories and a contract for the use of the Wright Whirlwind Motor.

It is conjectured that, on each of the above trips to the United States, Adams was engaged in Soviet espionage.


Another case that emphasizes the use of falsified passports concerns the journey of a Soviet agent who said he was given very little advice about travel and entry techniques. He was sent from Moscow to New York in 1934 under private cover. He proceeded as follows:

1. Removed labels from his clothing.
2. Limited amount of wearing apparel carried with him.
3. Dropped the Russian language.
4. Left Moscow by train traveling on a false American passport to Vienna.
5. Spoke English en route.
6. Met Vienna contact as directed and exchanged his American for a false Danish passport. (He said the official in the photography shop in the OGPU office where he secured his passports may have given him some background about Scandinavia.)
7. Spoke German to Vienna contact.
8. Hesitated about going to the United States Consulate at Vienna or American Express to handle visa matters.
9. Thought of saying he was going to see the Chicago World's Fair.
10. Pondered the possibility of entering the United States through Cuba or Mexico.
11. Secured a six-month travel visa for a "vacation in Mexico."
12. Approached a tourist agency and explained he wished to travel to Mexico via Italy.
13. Sent a note back to his director at Moscow from Genoa.
14. Boarded a passenger freighter.
15. Went to United States Consulate in Tampico, Mexico, to obtain a transit visa to go to New York "for travel to Europe." Had to present a ticket for European travel.
16. Chatted casually with the Immigration Officer at International Bridge, Laredo, Texas.
17. Showed officer his transit visa.
18. Registered under Danish name at hotel.
19. Traveled to New York by train.
20. Contacted Amtorg.
21. Boarded the Normandy for return to Russia on a Canadian passport in his true name. Ovakimian gave him a written background.

22. In Paris picked up his Danish passport already stamped to take him through Switzerland, Austria and Poland.
23. To return to the United States, was given papers of a naturalized Canadian citizen of Finnish descent.
24. Returned to New York via Latvia; Paris; Port Arthur, Canada.

Under certain circumstances, Soviet espionage agents use a special type of travel document, similar in appearance to a genuine passport. The document is known as a "Sojourn Permit" or "Vid Na Zhitelstvo." Another United States intelligence agency has investigated the origin and use of this document and reports that it is not a valid passport although some countries will affix their visas. It is issued only by the Soviet embassies and consulates outside the USSR to persons being granted Soviet citizenship under the program of naturalizing White Russians, persons originating in areas annexed by the USSR but living outside the USSR, and persons who have lost their Soviet citizenship for any reason. This citizenship so acquired may be kept secret and its possessor forced to retain his former status abroad as cover for carrying on agent activity.

III. USE OF PARACHUTES FOR ILLEGAL ENTRY



VI. ESCAPE DEVICES USED BY SOVIET AGENTS

Besides emphasizing the methods for facilitating travel on fraudulent passports, the instructions which Julius Rosenberg gave to David Greenglass also reveal a pattern of travel action for a compromised agent.

About February, 1950, when Klaus Fuchs was arrested, Rosenberg advised Greenglass to leave the country before his activity might be disclosed. Greenglass explained:

> "I was to go to Mexico City by train with my family. There I was to rent a house and write a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. In the letter I was to mention something about the United Nations. I was to wait three days at which time I would go to the Plaza de la (something or other) and stand in front of the statue of Christopher Columbus at 5 p. m. with my thumb in the Mexico City street guide. A man would come to me....The man would give me passports and money for a trip to either Stockholm, Sweden, or Berne, Switzerland, where I was to repeat the same procedure and if I were to go to Stockholm I would stand in front of a statue of Linnaeus, at which time I would receive the necessary papers to continue my trip to Czechoslovakia where I was to write to the Soviet Ambassador to merely state, 'I am here.'"

According to Rosenberg, Mexico City is the springboard and from there his friends obtain passage to a predecided destination.

Elizabeth Bentley was told that if she were able to get to Mexico or Canada, the passport and visa problem could be handled in those countries. When a Mr. Tamer was accused of removing documents from

files of the Crucible Steel Co., Harrison, New Jersey, he went into hiding and later left for the Soviet Union.


Two of Ignatz Reiss's assassins escaped to Mexico, another to Spain.

It is understood to have been the practice of OGPU to give travel advice to their prospective foreign agents who have not had the benefits of a training course. One agent stated that he could recall conversations at various times about major blunders, or agents being disclosed. Talk among the group was about how the agent should have listened to the instructions given to him concerning his method of travel.

Six days after David Greenglass was arrested, Morton Sobell and his family took flight from New York by American Airlines for Mexico City. After his arrival there, he hid out in the rooming house section of that city under the name of N. Walter until the date of his location through Bureau investigation and his arrest by the Mexican Security Police.

Rosenberg is said to have described Sobell's flight as foolhardy, stating that if he had consulted him, he (Rosenberg) could have arranged for Sobell's escape to Mexico through his contacts.

Investigations have brought out the evidence that Party leaders have been instructed to establish secret hide-outs for use in emergencies. Leading officials in the United States have been told to avoid being arrested and to make every effort to reach Mexico if the Communist Party is forced to go underground. Directions have been given for contacting the Communist Party in Mexico upon arrival.



An avenue of escape in wartime is found in the advice to seek an assignment in counterintelligence close to the front, contact the partisans, desert with them and with their help return to the USSR.

Agents who have lost favor with Moscow are sometimes "called home." Paul and Hede Massing were successful in escaping from Russia after complying with their summons. At first they met difficulties in regard to their requests to the Soviets to return their travel documents and to issue exit visas. Her passport and his certificate of identity were genuinely American and they insisted upon using them although the Soviet agents urging them to return to Russia had insisted that they use false passports. Finally Mrs. Massing threatened to go to the American Embassy for help and hinted that she had left in the United States the story of their activities and departure for Moscow, and if she and her husband did not return to the United States this story might be made public. Within three hours, the papers were in her hands.

The Rubenses, of the mysterious Robinson-Rubens passport case, were not as successful in freeing themselves after their trip "home." "Richard," identified by Whittaker Chambers as Rubens, was the Soviet agent whom J. Peters contacted regarding documents for identification, The chief of "Richard's" apparatus, General Berzin, had been liquidated. When "Richard" was summoned, he knew his turn had come. Therefore, skilled in passport falsification matters, it seems he made use of his knowledge to plant clues in order that Soviet action against him and his wife would be discovered by United States authorities.

For himself and his American wife, he secured two sets of passports on the same day by filing applications with conspirators at the New York County Clerk's office where three contacts of J. Peters' underground apparatus were employed. The first set was taken out in the name of an unknown young man and woman named Robinson; the other set in the name of Rubens. Upon receiving the Robinson passports, Richard replaced the pictures with those of himself and his wife, but the application filed with the State Department still carried the Robinson pictures. The preparation came to light when Mrs. Rubens in Moscow sought help from the American Embassy there in locating her husband who "had disappeared."

Chambers concludes:

"...From the first, I had been puzzled as to why an underground worker of Richard's experience would make two passport applications in one day, in an unusual way in an unusual place. I also wondered why he would take his American wife to Moscow during the Purge. I decided presently that he had taken her on purpose so that she might intercede for him if necessary. And he had left that curiously open trail (there were other easily followed clues also) so that it would be discovered. How desperate he must have been! And, in returning to Moscow, what a razor's edge he elected to walk on." *

* Whittaker Chambers, Witness (New York: Random House, Inc., 1952), pp. 400-401.

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V. CONCLUSION

Placing their secret agents abroad to collect whatever information will be of use to the Soviets has resulted in the employment of certain travel and entry techniques which have been mentioned briefly in this paper.

We have seen how the Soviet Intelligence Service uses official assignments as cover for key espionage agents. We have also observed that added opportunities have been secured by the use of nonofficial or private cover and concealed illegal entries.

We have noted how agents unprotected by official cover make use of carefully prepared false identities and false documents.

We have seen the numerous techniques and something of the scope and variations used in the past by Soviet Intelligence. In the absence of information regarding future operations, we must assume that Soviet agents may continue to use these techniques for travel and entry. We may also assume that entirely new plans adapted to currently changing needs and policies will be put into practice. It will be important for our security officers and counterintelligence agents to recognize the old techniques and be alert to the use of new ones.